Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

被引:155
作者
Bandiera, Oriana [1 ]
Prat, Andrea [1 ]
Valletti, Tommaso [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[2] Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Sch Business, London SW7 2AZ, England
[3] Univ Roma Tor Vergata, Dept Econ, Rome, Italy
关键词
CORRUPTION; ENFORCEMENT; PROCUREMENT; INCENTIVES; CONTRACTS; INDONESIA; UGANDA; COSTS;
D O I
10.1257/aer.99.4.1278
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
s We propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker, whereas passive waste does not. We analyze purchases of standardized goods by Italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency. We find that: (i) some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods; (ii) differences are correlated with governance structure; (iii) the variation in prices is principally date to variation in passive rather than active waste; and (iv) passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste. (JEL H11, H57, H83)
引用
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页码:1278 / 1308
页数:31
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