Lending booms and lending standards

被引:385
作者
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni [1 ]
Marquez, Robert
机构
[1] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
[2] CEPR, London, England
[3] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01065.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.
引用
收藏
页码:2511 / 2546
页数:36
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