Network software security and user incentives

We study the effect of user incentives on software security in a network of individual users under costly patching and negative network security externalities. For proprietary software or freeware, we compare four alternative policies to manage network security: (i) consumer self-patching (where no external incentives are provided for patching or purchasing); (ii) mandatory patching; (iii) patching rebate; and (iv) usage tax. We show that for proprietary software, when the software security risk and the patching costs are high, for both a welfare-maximizing social planner and a profit-maximizing vendor, a patching rebate dominates the other policies. However, when the patching cost or the security risk is low, self-patching is best. We also show that when a rebate is effective, the profit-maximizing rebate is decreasing in the security risk and increasing in patching costs. The welfare-maximizing rebates are also increasing in patching costs, but can be increasing in the effective security risk when patching costs are high. For freeware, a usage tax is the most effective policy except when both patching costs, and security risk are low, in which case a patching rebate prevails. Optimal patching rebates and taxes tend to increase with increased security risk and patching costs, but can decrease in the security risk for high-risk levels. Our results suggest that both the value generated from software and vendor profits can be significantly improved by mechanisms that target user incentives to maintain software security.