DEVIANT VERSUS ASPIRATIONAL RISK TAKING: THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK ON BRIBERY EXPENDITURE AND R&D INTENSITY
被引:339
作者:
Xu, Dean
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Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, AustraliaMonash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
Xu, Dean
[1
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Zhou, Kevin Zheng
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Univ Hong Kong, Chair Strategy & Int Business, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaMonash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
Zhou, Kevin Zheng
[2
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Du, Fei
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Univ Illinois, Accountancy, Urbana, IL USAMonash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
Du, Fei
[3
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[1] Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Chair Strategy & Int Business, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Combining the theses of "problemistic search" and "slack search," past research in the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that both low- and high-performing firms may engage in the same type of risk-taking activity. We counter this view with a consistent, motivation-based logic in the theory: low-performing firms are fixated on finding short-term solutions to immediate problems, so they have an increased probability of exhibiting deviant risk-taking behavior such as bribery, whereas high-performing firms are concerned about sustaining their competitive advantage in the long run and will more likely engage in aspirational risk taking such as research and development (R&D). Using a sample of 9,633 firm-year observations covering 2,224 listed companies in China, we find that, as a firm's performance falls further below its aspiration level, it has larger abnormal entertainment spending, an implicit measure of bribery expenditure, but not higher R&D intensity. However, as a firm's performance rises further above its aspiration level, it has greater R&D intensity, but not more bribery expenses. Legal development and industry competition moderate the relationship between performance feedback and risk-taking behavior.
机构:
Auburn Univ, Dept Finance, Auburn, AL 36849 USAUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Barth, James R.
Lin, Chen
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City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Lin, Chen
Lin, Ping
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Lingnan Univ, Dept Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Lin, Ping
Song, Frank M.
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Univ Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
机构:
Auburn Univ, Dept Finance, Auburn, AL 36849 USAUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Barth, James R.
Lin, Chen
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Lin, Chen
Lin, Ping
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机构:
Lingnan Univ, Dept Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Lin, Ping
Song, Frank M.
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机构:
Univ Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaUniv Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China