The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria

被引：38

作者：

McKelvey, RD ^{[1
]}

McLennan, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA, DEPT ECON, MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55455 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1997年 / 72卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1996.2214

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Let S=Pi(i=1)(n) S-i be the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (s(10),...,s(n0)) epsilon S be any strategy n-tuple, and let T-i=S-i-{s(i0)}, i=1,...,n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with strategy sets S-i is the number of partitions P={P-1,...,P-n} of boolean OR(r) T-i such that, for each i, \P-i\=\T-t\ and P-i boolean AND T-i=0. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

引用

页码：411 / 425

页数：15