Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage

被引:156
作者
Korinek, Anton [1 ,2 ]
Simsek, Alp [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, 3400 North Charles St,456 Mergenthaler Hall, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] MIT, 400 Main St,Bldg E17,Room 244, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[4] CEPR, London, England
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
MONETARY-POLICY; MACROECONOMIC MODEL; FISCAL-POLICY; BALANCE-SHEET; INVESTMENT; INFLATION; CONSTRAINTS; CRISES; COSTS; DEBT;
D O I
10.1257/aer.20140289
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps. When constrained households engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained households to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this environment, households' ex ante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. Welfare can be improved with macroprudential policies targeted toward reducing leverage. Interest rate policy is inferior to macroprudential policies in dealing with excessive leverage.
引用
收藏
页码:699 / 738
页数:40
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