Compassion and Beyond

被引：44

作者：

Crisp, Roger ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford St Annes Coll, Oxford OX2 6HS, England

来源：

ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE | 2008年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

Compassion; Emotion; Virtue; Aristotle; Nussbaum;

D O I：

10.1007/s10677-008-9114-x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper is a discussion of the emotion of compassion or pity, and the corresponding virtue. It begins by placing the emotion of compassion in the moral conceptual landscape, and then moves to reject the currently dominant view, a version of Aristotelianism developed by Martha Nussbaum, in favour of a non-cognitive conception of compassion as a feeling. An alternative neo-Aristotelian account is then outlined. The relation of the virtue of compassion to other virtues is plotted, and some doubts sown about its practical significance.

引用

页码：233 / 246

页数：14

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