Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions

被引:71
作者
Aktas, Nihat [1 ]
de Bodt, Eric [2 ]
Roll, Richard [3 ]
机构
[1] EMLYON Business Sch, F-69130 Ecully, France
[2] Univ Lille 2, Lille Sch Management, F-59020 Lille, France
[3] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
Learning; Hubris; Merger and acquisition; Serial acquisitions; Abnormal return; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; TAKEOVER CONTESTS; ACQUIRING FIRMS; MERGER WAVES; BAD BIDDERS; AUCTIONS; MARKET; STOCK; TOEHOLDS; EXCHANGE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.01.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Recent empirical research has shown that, from deal to deal, serial acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are declining. This has been most often attributed to CEOs hubris. We question this interpretation. Our theoretical analysis shows that (i) a declining CAR from deal to deal is not sufficient to reveal the presence of hubris, (ii) if CEOs are learning, economically motivated and rational, a declining CAR from deal to deal should be observed, (iii) predictions can be derived about the impact of learning and hubris on the time between successive deals and, finally. (iv) predictions about the CAR and about the time between successive deal trends lead to testable empirical hypotheses. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:543 / 561
页数:19
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