Competitive devaluations: toward a welfare-based approach

被引：66

作者：

Corsetti, G ^{[1
]}

Pesenti, P

Roubini, N

Tille, C

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[2] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[3] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA

[4] NBER, New York, NY 10045 USA

[5] NYU, CEPR, New York, NY 10012 USA

[6] NBER, New York, NY 10012 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 51卷 / 01期

关键词：

competitive devaluations; exchange rate shocks; contagion; global trade links; law of one price;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-1996(99)00043-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper revisits the international transmission of exchange rate shocks in a multicountry economy, providing a choice-theoretic framework for the policy analysis of competitive devaluations. As opposed to the traditional view, a devaluation by one country does not necessarily have an adverse beggar-thy-neighbor effect on its trading partners, because they can benefit from an improvement in their terms of trade. Furthermore, a retaliatory devaluation need not be the optimal strategy for the neighbor countries, as the induced terms of trade deterioration can be large enough to offset the gains from defending their export market share.

引用

页码：217 / 241

页数：25