The balance of power in closely held corporations

被引:357
作者
Bennedsen, M
Wolfenzon, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
关键词
closely held corporations; ownership structure; control dilution; controlling coalition; one-share-one vote;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00068-4
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its shares. We show that the founder of the firm can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. By grouping member cash flows, a coalition internalizes to a larger extent the consequences of its actions and hence takes more efficient actions than would any of its individual members. The model has implications for the optimal bundling of cash flow and voting rights, and for the optimal number and size of shareholders. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32; G34.
引用
收藏
页码:113 / 139
页数:27
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