Bertrand competition and Cournot outcomes: further results

被引：31

作者：

Boccard, N

Wauthy, X

机构：

[1] Fac Univ St Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

[2] CORE, Brussels, Belgium

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2000年 / 68卷 / 03期

关键词：

price competition; capacity commitment;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00256-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The model of Kreps and Scheinkman where firms choose capacities and then compete in price is extended to oligopoly. Further, capacity is an imperfect commitment device: firms can produce beyond capacities at an additional unit cost theta. When theta is larger than the Cournot price, the Cournot outcome obtains in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. When theta decreases from the Cournot price towards zero, the whole range of prices, from Cournot to Bertrand, is obtained in equilibrium. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D43; F13; L13.

引用

页码：279 / 285

页数：7

共 8 条

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[Anonymous], 1925, PAPERS RELATING POLI

[2]

Bertrand J., 1883, Journal de savants, V67, P499

[3] THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN DISCONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GAMES .1. THEORY [J].