What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading

被引:221
作者
Ravina, Enrichetta [1 ]
Sapienza, Paola [2 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Business Sch, Finance & Econ Div, New York, NY 10023 USA
[2] NBER, Kellogg Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; BOARDS;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhp027
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other executives. The findings reveal that independent directors earn positive substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference from the same firm's executives is relatively small at most horizons. We also find that executives and independent directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance, the gap between these two widens in such firms, and that independent directors sitting on the audit committee earn higher returns than other independent directors at the same firm. Independent directors also earn significantly abnormal returns when they sell the company stock in a window before bad news and around earnings restatements. (JEL G3, G34, K22)
引用
收藏
页码:962 / 1003
页数:42
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