Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

被引:108
作者
Batrancea, Larissa [1 ]
Nichita, Anca [1 ,2 ]
Olsen, Jerome [3 ]
Kogler, Christoph [3 ,4 ]
Kirchler, Erich [3 ]
Hoelzl, Erik [5 ]
Weiss, Avi [6 ,7 ,8 ]
Torgler, Benno [9 ,10 ,11 ]
Fooken, Jonas [12 ]
Fuller, Joanne [13 ]
Schaffner, Markus [9 ,10 ]
Banuri, Sheheryar [14 ]
Hassanein, Medhat [15 ]
Alarcon-Garcia, Gloria [16 ,17 ]
Aldemir, Ceyhan [18 ]
Apostol, Oana [19 ]
Weinberg, Diana Bank [20 ]
Batrancea, Joan [21 ]
Belianin, Alexis [22 ,23 ]
Bello Gomez, Felipe de Jesus [24 ]
Briguglio, Marie [25 ]
Dermol, Valerij [26 ]
Doyle, Elaine [27 ]
Gcabo, Rebone [28 ,29 ]
Gong, Binglin [30 ]
Ennya, Sara [31 ]
Essel-Anderson, Anthony [32 ]
Frecknall-Hughes, Jane [33 ]
Hasanain, Ali [34 ]
Hizen, Yoichi [35 ]
Huber, Odilo [36 ]
Kaplanoglou, Georgia [37 ]
Kudla, Janusz [38 ]
Lemoine, Jeremy E. [39 ,40 ]
Leurcharusmee, Supanika [41 ]
Matthiasson, Thorolfur [42 ,43 ]
Mehta, Sanjeev [44 ]
Min, Sejin [45 ]
Naufal, George [46 ]
Niskanen, Mervi [47 ]
Nordblom, Katarina [48 ,49 ,50 ]
Ozturk, Engin Bagis [18 ]
Pacheco, Luis [51 ]
Pantya, Jozsef [52 ,53 ]
Rapanos, Vassilis [54 ]
Roland-Levy, Christine [55 ]
Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria [56 ]
Salamzadeh, Aidin [57 ]
Savadori, Lucia [58 ]
Scheibe, Vidar [59 ]
机构
[1] Babes Bolyai Univ, Fac Business, 7 Horea St, Cluj Napoca 400174, Romania
[2] 1 Decembrie 1918 Univ Alba Iulia, Fac Econ Sci, 15-17 Unirii St, Alba Iulia 510009, Romania
[3] Univ Vienna, Fac Psychol, Dept Appl Psychol Work Educ & Econ, Univ Str 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
[4] Tilburg Univ, Dept Social Psychol, Warandelaan 2, NL-5037 AB Tilburg, Netherlands
[5] Univ Cologne, Fac Management Econ & Social Sci, Inst Sociol & Social Psychol, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50932 Cologne, Germany
[6] Bar Ilan Univ, Dept Econ, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel
[7] Taub Ctr Social Policy Studies Israel, 15 Haari St,POB 3489, IL-9103401 Jerusalem, Israel
[8] Inst Study Labor Econ IZA, Schaumburg Lippe Str 5-9, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[9] Queensland Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Finance, 2 George St, Brisbane, Qld 4000, Australia
[10] Queensland Univ Technol, Ctr Behav Econ Soc & Technol BEST, 2 George St, Brisbane, Qld 4000, Australia
[11] CREMA, Sudstr 11, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland
[12] Univ Queensland, Ctr Business & Econ Hlth, 20 Cornwall St, Woolloongabba, Qld 4102, Australia
[13] Eliiza, Level 2,452 Flinders St, Melbourne, Vic 3000, Australia
[14] Univ East Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[15] Amer Univ Cairo, Sch Business, Dept Management, AUC Ave,POB 74, Cairo 11835, Egypt
[16] Univ Murcia, Fac Econ & Business Adm, Dept Polit Sci Social Anthropol & Publ Finance, Campus Espinardo, E-30100 Murcia, Spain
[17] Univ Murcia, Fiscal Observ Spain, Campus Espinardo, E-30100 Murcia, Spain
[18] Dokuz Eylul Univ, Fac Business, Tinaztepe Campus, TR-35390 Izmir, Turkey
[19] Univ Turku, Turku Sch Econ, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, Turku 20014, Finland
[20] Berlin Sch Econ & Law, Dept Econ & Business, Badenschestr 95, D-10825 Berlin, Germany
[21] Babes Bolyai Univ, Fac Econ & Business Adm, 58-60 Teodor Mihali St, Cluj Napoca 400591, Romania
[22] Natl Res Univ, Higher Sch Econ, Shabolovka St 26, Moscow 109048, Russia
[23] IMEMO RAS, Profsoyouznaya St 23, Moscow 117997, Russia
[24] Univ Las Amer Puebla, Dept Banking & Investments, Ex Hac Sta Catarina Martir S-N, Puebla 72810, Mexico
[25] Univ Malta, Fac Econ Management & Accountancy, Dept Econ, MSD-2080 Msida, Malta
[26] Int Sch Social & Business Studies, Mariborska Cesta 7, Celje 3000, Slovenia
[27] Univ Limerick, Kemeny Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Limerick, Ireland
[28] Univ Pretoria, Fac Humanities, Dept Psychol, Lynnwood Rd, ZA-0002 Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa
[29] 570 Ferhesen St, ZA-0181 Pretoria, South Africa
[30] East China Normal Univ, Fac Econ & Management, 3663 North Zhongshan Rd, Shanghai 200062, Peoples R China
[31] Ibn Zohr Univ Agadir, Fac Law Econ & Social Sci, BP S-1234, Agadir 80000, Morocco
[32] Ashesi Univ, Dept Business Adm, 1 Univ Ave,PMB CT 3, Cantonments, Accra, Ghana
[33] Univ Nottingham, Business Sch, Jubilee Campus,Wollaton Rd3, Nottingham NG8 1BB, England
[34] Lahore Univ Management Sci, Dept Econ, Sect U, DHA, Lahore 54792, Pakistan
[35] Kochi Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Management, 2-22 Eikokuji Cho, Kochi, Kochi 7808515, Japan
[36] Univ Fribourg, Dept Psychol, Rue Faucigny 2, CH-1701 Fribourg, Switzerland
[37] Natl & Kapodistrian Univ Athens, Dept Econ, Sofokleous 1, Athens 10559, Greece
[38] Univ Warsaw, Fac Econ Sci, Dluga Str 44-50, PL-00241 Warsaw, Poland
[39] Univ East London, Sch Psychol, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ, England
[40] ESCP Europe Business Sch, 527 Finchley Rd, London NW3 7BG, England
[41] Chiang Mai Univ, Fac Econ, 239 Huay Kaew Rd, Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand
[42] Univ Iceland, Fac Social Sci, Dept Econ, IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland
[43] Univ Iceland, Dept Econ, Fac Social Sci, IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland
[44] Royal Thimphu Coll, Fac Social Sci, Ngabiphu 1122, Thimphu, Bhutan
[45] Dongguk Univ, Dept Econ, 30 Pildong Ro 1 Gil, Seoul 04620, South Korea
[46] Texas A&M Univ, Publ Policy Res Inst, 4476 TAMU, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[47] Univ Eastern Finland, Sch Business, PL 1627, Kuopio 70211, Finland
[48] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Box 640, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
[49] Univ Gothenburg, Ctr Collect Act Res, Box 711, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
[50] Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, Box 256, SE-75105 Uppsala, Sweden
关键词
Trust; Power; Slippery slope framework; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; EVASION; PUNISHMENT; AUDIT;
D O I
10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 46 条
[1]
Adams C., 2001, For good and evil: the impact of taxes on the course of civilization, Vsecond
[2]
Alm J., 2012, CESifo forum, V13, P33
[3]
Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality [J].
Alm, James ;
Torgler, Benno .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 2011, 101 (04) :635-651
[4]
Taxpayer information assistance services and tax compliance behavior [J].
Alm, James ;
Cherry, Todd ;
Jones, Michael ;
McKee, Michael .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2010, 31 (04) :577-586
[5]
Andreoni J, 1998, J ECON LIT, V36, P818
[6]
[Anonymous], 2014, MEAS TAX COMPL OUTC
[7]
[Anonymous], 2012, IRS RES B
[8]
[Anonymous], 2014, INTERDISCIPLINARY IN
[9]
[Anonymous], INCOME TAX STUDY HIS
[10]
[Anonymous], COOP COMPL WORK LARG