Separating economic from political influences on government decisions

被引:11
作者
Crone, L
Tschirhart, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wyoming, Dept Econ & Finance, Laramie, WY 82071 USA
[2] US Forest Serv, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA
关键词
public interest theory; forestry; forest service; interest groups; regulatory behavior;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00045-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The public interest theory is a poor predictor of government decisions relative to interest group theories, but a sophisticated public interest theory is a more serious alternative to the former. Testing the sophisticated theory's predictions is problematic, however, when public interest is coincident with an interest group's interests. A four-step method is developed that disentangles public interest and interest group interests by separating economic from political incentives. Applying the method to the National Forest Service decisions about wilderness designations indicates whether interest groups were successful in influencing allocation decisions and whether allocation decisions were in the public interest. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 425
页数:21
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