Risk and CEO turnover

被引：130

作者：

Bushman, Robert ^{[2
]}

Dai, Zhonglan ^{[1
]}

Wang, Xue ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Sch Management, Dallas, TX 75083 USA

[2] Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, Chapel Hill, NC USA

[3] Emory Univ, Goizueta Business Sch, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 96卷 / 03期

关键词：

CEO turnover; Idiosyncratic risk; Systematic risk; CEO compensation; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; INTERACTION TERMS; COMPENSATION; DIRECTORS; IMPACT; LOGIT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates how performance risk impacts a board's ability to learn about the unknown talent of a chief executive officer (CEO). We theorize that the information content of performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk and that turnover performance-sensitivity is also increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We further investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, showing that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels decrease in the probability of turnover. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：381 / 398

页数：18

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