Query Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks

被引:26
作者
Carbunar, Bogdan [1 ]
Yu, Yang [1 ]
Shi, Weidong [1 ]
Pearce, Michael [1 ]
Vasudevan, Venu [1 ]
机构
[1] Motorola Labs, Applicat Res Ctr, Schaumburg, IL 60195 USA
关键词
Algorithms; Security; Data storage and query processing; security; privacy; data integrity;
D O I
10.1145/1689239.1689244
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Existing mechanisms for querying wireless sensor networks leak client interests to the servers performing the queries. The leaks are not only in terms of specific regions of interest but also of client access patterns. In this article we introduce the problem of preserving the privacy of clients querying a wireless sensor network owned by untrusted organizations. We first propose an efficient protocol, SPYC, that ensures full client privacy in settings where the servers providing access to the network are honest-but-curious and whose collaboration does not extend beyond well-defined administrative purposes. Furthermore, we study the same query privacy problem in a setting where servers exhibit malicious behavior or where powerful external attackers have access to sensor network traffic information. In this setting we propose two metrics for quantifying the privacy achieved by a client's query sequence. We then extend SPYC with a suite of practical algorithms, then analyze the privacy and efficiency levels they provide. Our TOSSIM simulations show that the proposed extensions are communication efficient while significantly improving client privacy levels.
引用
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页数:34
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