Violence and economic agendas in civil wars: Some policy implications

This article argues that insufficient account has been taken-both in policy-making and scholarly circles-of the political economy of civil wars and the variety of 'functions' which violence may perform, most markedly in politically fragile, ethnically divided, and economically weak states. The article is divided into two parts. The first examines how the resort to violence and the reluctance to end wars often reflect a rational analysis of cost and benefits on the part of various actors in civil wars, discussing two cases where an understanding of economic agendas and motives sheds important light on the persistence of conflict: Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The second section turns to the impact of economic agendas on the efforts of external actors to address intrastate conflict, and identifies two areas of outside involvement where the failure to account for the presence of economic interests by conflicting parties has critically undermined attempts to provide meaningful assistance. The article concludes by highlighting some general lessons to which particular attention should be given when considering third-party involvement in intrastate conflicts.