Agency costs of corporate risk management

被引:80
作者
Tufano, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3666152
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper discusses a potential cost of corporate risk management strategies that are based on cash-flow hedging. Cash-flow hedging strategies allow firms to avoid the deadweight costs of external financing by setting their internal cash flows equal to their investment needs. In the presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, these hedging strategies can be used to reduce shareholder wealth, insofar as they remove the valuable discipline that obtaining new external financing imposes on managers.
引用
收藏
页码:67 / 77
页数:11
相关论文
共 38 条
[1]  
BERKMAN H, 1997, FINANCIAL MANAGE WIN, P69
[2]  
Berkman H., 1996, FINANCIAL MANAGE SUM, P5
[3]  
BODNAR GM, 1995, FINANCIAL MANAGE WIN, P113
[4]  
CHANG C, 1997, UNPUB DOES HEDGING A
[5]  
CULP C, 1995, J APPL CORPORATE WIN, P62
[6]  
Donaldson G., 1961, CORPORATE DEBT CAPAC
[7]  
EASTERBROOK FH, 1984, AM ECON REV, V74, P650
[8]  
ESTY BC, 1994, J APPL CORPORATE FAL, P33
[9]   RISK MANAGEMENT - COORDINATING CORPORATE-INVESTMENT AND FINANCING POLICIES [J].
FROOT, KA ;
SCHARFSTEIN, DS ;
STEIN, JC .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1993, 48 (05) :1629-1658
[10]  
FROOT KA, 1994, HARVARD BUSINESS NOV, P91