Competing for capital in a 'lumpy' world

被引:122
作者
Kind, HJ
Knarvik, KHM
Schjelderup, G
机构
[1] Fdn Res Econ & Business Adm, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
[2] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
[3] Norwegian Ctr Org & Management, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00119-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper uses a new economic geography model to analyze tax competition between two countries trying to attract internationally mobile capital. Each government may levy a source tax on capital and a lump sum tax on fixed labor. If industry is concentrated in one of the countries, the analysis finds that the host country will gain from setting its source tax on capital above that of the other country. In particular, the host may increase its welfare per capita by setting a positive source tax on capital and capture the positive externality that arise in the agglomeration. If industry is not concentrated, however, both countries will subsidize capital. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:253 / 274
页数:22
相关论文
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