Vertical research joint ventures

被引：67

作者：

Banerjee, S ^{[1
]}

Lin, P

机构：

[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Econ, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA

[2] Lingnan Univ, Dept Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2001年 / 19卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

R&D; vertical research joint ventures; cost sharing;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00046-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the incentives of firms to form vertical research joint ventures (RJVs) which enable an upstream supplier to internalize the positive externality of its innovation on a downstream market, while giving the downstream members a cost advantage over their non-member rivals. Under the cost-sharing rules considered, the upstream member desires a larger RJV compared to the downstream members. R&D subsidies may be detrimental to social welfare. The optimal RJV size for the upstream (downstream) member decreases (increases) with R&D cost and increases (decreases) with the gains from innovation and the size of market. An increase in upstream competition has the effect of enlarging the optimal RJV. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：285 / 302

页数：18

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