The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks

被引:74
作者
Duffie, Darrell [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
SCOPE;
D O I
10.1257/jep.24.1.51
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
During the recent financial crisis, major dealer banks - that is, banks that intermediate markets for securities and derivatives - suffered from new forms of bank runs. The most vivid examples are the 2008 failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Dealer banks are often parts of large complex financial organizations whose failures can damage the economy significantly. As a result, they are sometimes considered "too big to fail." The mechanics by which dealer banks can fail and the policies available to treat the systemic risk of their failures differ markedly from the case of conventional commercial bank runs. These failure mechanics are the focus of this article. This is not a review of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Systemic risk is considered only in passing. Both the financial crisis and the systemic importance of large dealer banks are nevertheless obvious and important motivations.
引用
收藏
页码:51 / 72
页数:22
相关论文
共 55 条
[1]  
ABATE J, 2009, MONEY MARKETS TRIPAR
[2]  
[Anonymous], SHAR REP UBSS WRIT
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2009, SLAPPED FACE INVISIB
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2009, DOES CENTRAL CLEARIN
[5]  
*BANK INT SETTL, 2009, OTC DER MARK ACT 1 H
[6]  
*BANK INT SETTL, 2009, ROL VAL LEV PROC
[7]  
*BANK INT SETTL, 2007, NEW DEV CLEAR SETTL
[8]  
BARR A, 2007, MARKETWATCH 0622
[9]  
BARR A, 2007, MARKETWATCH 0718
[10]  
BERNANKE B, 2009, COUNC FOR REL MARCH