Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States

被引：340

作者：

Gompers, Paul A. ^{[2
,3
]}

Ishii, Joy ^{[4
]}

Metrick, Andrew ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Yale Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[4] Stanford Univ, Stanford Grad Sch Business, Dept Finance, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2010年 / 23卷 / 03期

关键词：

VOTING COMMON-STOCK; CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; TAKEOVER DEFENSES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUE; SINGLE-CLASS; RIGHTS;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhp024

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower. (JEL G32, G34)

引用

页码：1051 / 1088

页数：38

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