Blame, game theory and economic policy - The cases of health and public finance

被引：4

作者：

Anand, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] De Montfort Univ, Dept Econ, Milton Keynes MK7 6HP, Bucks, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 1998年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

blame; counterfactuals; economic policy; game theory; political psychology; poll tax; rationing;

D O I：

10.1177/0951692898010001005

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

Two case-studies are used to suggest that political sensitivity to blame has important consequences for the design and success of economic policy. The note begins with some remarks indicating how blame might be modelled in the standard noncooperative game-theoretic framework.

引用

页码：111 / 123

页数：13

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