Optimal non-linear health insurance

被引:50
作者
Blomqvist, A
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London
关键词
health insurance; moral hazard; optimal insurance; non-linear insurance;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-6296(96)00529-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Most theoretical and empirical work on efficient health insurance has been based on models with linear insurance schedules (a constant co-insurance parameter). In this paper, dynamic optimization techniques are used to analyse the properties of optimal non-linear insurance schedules in a model similar to one originally considered by Spence and Zeckhauser (American Economic Review, 1971, 61, 380-387) and reminiscent of those that have been used in the literature on optimal income taxation. The results of a preliminary numerical example suggest that the welfare losses from the implicit subsidy to employer-financed health insurance under US tax law may be a good deal smaller than previously estimated using linear models.
引用
收藏
页码:303 / 321
页数:19
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