A Model of Delegated Project Choice

被引：78

作者：

Armstrong, Mark ^{[1
]}

Vickers, John ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[2] Univ Oxford All Souls Coll, Oxford OX1 4AL, England

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2010年 / 78卷 / 01期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

Delegation; principal-agent; rules; merger policy; MECHANISM DESIGN; ORGANIZATIONS; AUTHORITY; TRANSFERS;

D O I：

10.3982/ECTA7965

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the agent must invest effort to discover a project, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the principal can adopt more complex schemes than simple permission sets.

引用

页码：213 / 244

页数：32

共 17 条

[1] Formal and real authority in organizations [J].