Promotions and incentives in nonprofit and for-profit organizations

被引:62
作者
Devaro, Jed [1 ]
Brookshire, Dana
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Sch Ind & Labor Relat, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] Bank Amer, Charlotte, NC 28255 USA
来源
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW | 2007年 / 60卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.1177/001979390706000301
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-profits to base promotions on job performance or merit; nonprofits were less likely to use output-contingent incentive contracts to motivate workers; and the observed difference in promotion rates between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors was more pronounced for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers. The authors also propose a theory that potentially explains the broad pattern of evidence they uncover, based on the idea that nonprofit workers arc more intrinsically motivated (attracted to their work for reasons transcending material compensation) than are for-profit workers.
引用
收藏
页码:311 / 339
页数:29
相关论文
共 34 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1980, WORK REDESIGN
[2]   INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT [J].
BAKER, GP .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1992, 100 (03) :598-614
[3]   COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES - PRACTICE VS THEORY [J].
BAKER, GP ;
JENSEN, MC ;
MURPHY, KJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1988, 43 (03) :593-616
[4]   Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation [J].
Bénabou, R ;
Tirole, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2003, 70 (03) :489-520
[5]   Does managed care change the management of nonprofit hospitals? Evidence from the executive labor market [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Hallock, KF ;
Arnould, R .
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, 2005, 58 (03) :494-514
[6]   Competition and incentives with motivated agents [J].
Besley, T ;
Ghatak, M .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (03) :616-636
[7]  
Cleverley W O, 1982, Health Care Manage Rev, V7, P7
[8]   Employer recruitment strategies and the labor market outcomes of new hires [J].
Devaro, J .
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2005, 43 (02) :263-282
[9]  
DEVARO J, 2006, RAND J EC, V27
[10]   THE ECONOMIC-ROLE OF THE NONPROFIT FIRM [J].
EASLEY, D ;
OHARA, M .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02) :531-538