Cooperative scale-free networks despite the presence of defector hubs

被引:57
作者
Poncela, J. [1 ]
Gomez-Gardenes, J. [1 ,2 ]
Floria, L. M. [1 ,3 ]
Moreno, Y. [1 ,4 ]
Sanchez, A. [1 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zaragoza, Inst Biocomputat & Phys Complex Syst, BIFI, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain
[2] Univ Rey Juan Carlos, Dept Matemat Aplicada, ESCET, E-28933 Madrid, Spain
[3] Univ Zaragoza, Dept Fis Mat Condensada, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain
[4] Univ Zaragoza, Dept Fis Teor, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain
[5] Univ Carlos III Madrid, GISC, Dept Matemat, E-28911 Madrid, Spain
[6] CSIC, UAM, Inst Ciencias Matemat, UCM,UC3M, E-28006 Madrid, Spain
关键词
PRISONERS-DILEMMA; HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; COMPLEX NETWORKS; SNOWDRIFT GAME; DYNAMICS; GRAPHS;
D O I
10.1209/0295-5075/88/38003
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Recent results have shown that heterogeneous populations are better suited to support cooperation than homogeneous settings when the Prisoner's Dilemma drives the evolutionary dynamics of the system. The same occurs when the network growth is coevolving together with the evolutionary dynamics, which also gives rise to highly cooperative scale-free networks. In the latter case, however, the organization of cooperation is radically different with respect to the case in which the underlying network is static. In this paper we study the structure of cooperation in static networks grown together with evolutionary dynamics and show that the general belief that hubs can only be occupied by cooperators does not hold. Moreover, these scale-free networks support high levels of cooperation despite having defector hubs. Our results have several important implications for the explanation of cooperative behavior in scale-free networks and highlight the importance that the formation of complex systems have on its function. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2009
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页数:6
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