Perfect zero-knowledge arguments for NP using any one-way permutation

被引:81
作者
Naor, M [1 ]
Ostrovsky, R
Venkatesan, R
Yung, M
机构
[1] Weizmann Inst Sci, Dept Appl Math & Comp Sci, IL-76100 Rehovot, Israel
[2] BELLCORE, Math & Cryptog Res Grp, Morristown, NJ 07960 USA
[3] Microsoft Corp, Res, Redmond, WA 98052 USA
[4] IBM Corp, Thomas J Watson Res Ctr, Yorktown Hts, NY 10598 USA
[5] Int Comp Sci Inst, Berkeley, CA 94704 USA
[6] IBM Corp, Almaden Res Ctr, San Jose, CA 95114 USA
[7] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
computer security; interactive protocols; cryptography;
D O I
10.1007/s001459900037
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Perfect zero-knowledge arguments is a cryptographic primitive which allows one polynomial-time player to convince another polynomial-time player of the validity of an NP statement, without revealing any additional information (in the information-theoretic sense). Here the security achieved is on-line: in order to cheat and validate a false theorem, the prover must break a cryptographic assumption on-line during the conversation, while the verifier cannot find (ever) any information unconditionally. Despite their practical and theoretical importance, it was only known how to implement zero-knowledge arguments based on specific algebraic assumptions. In this paper we show a general construction which can be based on any one-way permutation. The result is obtained by a construction of an information-theoretic secure bit-commitment protocol. The protocol is efficient (both parties are polynomial time) and can be based on any one-way permutation.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 108
页数:22
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