A case for taxing charitable donations

被引:11
作者
Blumkin, Tomer
Sadka, Efraim [1 ]
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Eitan Berglas Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
关键词
optimal taxation; re-distribution; charitable contributions; inequality; social status; signaling;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1555 / 1564
页数:10
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]  
Akerlof G., The economics of tagging as applied to the optimal income tax, American Economic Review, 68, pp. 8-19, (1978)
[2]  
Andreoni J., Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence, Journal of Political Economy, 97, pp. 1447-1458, (1989)
[3]  
Andreoni J., Impure altruism and donation to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving, Economic Journal, 100, pp. 464-477, (1990)
[4]  
Bergstrom T., Blume L., Varian H., On the private provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics, 29, pp. 25-49, (1986)
[5]  
Blumkin T., Sadka E., On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable Contributions, (2007)
[6]  
Boskin M., Sheshinski E., Optimal redistributive taxation when individual welfare depends upon relative income, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, pp. 589-601, (1978)
[7]  
Cooter R., Broughman B., Charity, publicity and the donation registry, Economists' Voice, 2, 3, (2005)
[8]  
Diamond P., Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences, Journal of Public Economics, 90, pp. 897-919, (2006)
[9]  
Frank R., Interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 510-520, (1984)
[10]  
Frank R., Are workers paid their marginal products?, American Economic Review, 74, pp. 549-571, (1984)