Access charges and quality choice in competing networks

被引：11

作者：

Cambini, C

Valletti, TM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Tanaka Business Sch, London SW7 2AZ, England

[2] CEPR, London SW7 2AZ, England

[3] Politecn Torino, Turin, Italy

来源：

INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2004年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

telecommunications; interconnection; investments; quality;

D O I：

10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the impact of reciprocal access charges on the incentives to invest in networks of higher quality. We show how private and social preferences always diverge once investments are endogenized. Private negotiations never lead to charges being set at their marginal cost. Whether or not marginal cost charges have good dynamic properties depends on the way investments in quality impact on traffic generated on the networks. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：391 / 409

页数：19

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