Contracting out and accountability

被引:29
作者
Mulgan, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Publ Policy Program, Canberra, ACT, Australia
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8500.1997.tb02493.x
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Governments are increasingly moving to contract out the provision of public service which have previously been delivered by public service departments. Contracting out typically implies provision by private sector contractors. However, it may also include in-house provision by public service departments or other public agencies where the right to provide is won through competitive tendering and is governed by contract. At the Commonwealth level, the trend has been given added impetus by the Coalition government elected in 1996 (Reith 1996; National Commission of Audit 1996). The main rationale for contracting out is to improve efficiency in service provision by harnessing the virtues of competition, in particular the superior productivity engendered among competitive providers (Industry Commission (IC) 1996, B3.4; Appendix E). At the same time, there is a legitimate expectation that providers of public services paid for by public funds will be publicly accountable (IC 1996, B1). However, contracting out has the potential to reduce the extent of public accountability by transferring the provision of public services to members of the private sector who are generally not subject to the same accountability requirements as public officials. Indeed, reduction in such accountability requirements may be one of the reasons for the greater efficiency of the private sector.
引用
收藏
页码:106 / 116
页数:11
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
ALFORD J, CONTRACT STATE
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1996, AUSTR PUBLIC SECTOR
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1996, REP COMM GOV
[4]  
[Anonymous], PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGE
[5]  
*ARC, 1997, CONTR OUT GOV SERV A
[6]  
Boston J., 1996, Public management: The New Zealand model
[7]  
*DEP DEF, 1995, COMM SUPP PROGR MAN
[8]  
*DEP FIN, 1997, PERF IMPR CYCL
[9]  
ERNST J, 1994, CONTRACT STATE
[10]  
FINN P, 1993, AUSTR Q, V65, P50