Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants

被引：43

作者：

Billett, Matthew T. ^{[1
]}

Mauer, David C. ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Yilei ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA

[2] Univ Texas Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083 USA

[3] Univ N Dakota, Grand Forks, ND 58201 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2010年 / 39卷 / 02期

关键词：

STOCK OPTION PLANS; CASH FLOW; COMPENSATION; IMPACT; PRICE; PAY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01080.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine stock and bond price reactions to CEOs' first stock option and/or restricted stock grants that appear on ExecuComp. We find positive stock price and negative bond price reactions. Changes in CEO pay-performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) sensitivities relate to the reactions. Stock reactions decrease with the change in delta and increase with the change in vega. Bond reactions are the opposite and depend on the CEO's prior equity ownership. Stockholder and bondholder wealth effects are negatively correlated for grants that cause a large change in the vega of CEO wealth, consistent with aggravated risk-shifting incentives.

引用

页码：463 / 487

页数：25

共 29 条

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