Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

被引：53

作者：

Levin, D

Ozdenoren, E

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2004年 / 118卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

auctions; uncertainty; ambiguity; number of bidders;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders ill the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：229 / 251

页数：23

共 28 条

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