Market information and firm performance

被引:176
作者
Raju, JS [1 ]
Roy, A
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
information; decision analysis; game theory; marketing research; competition;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1075.12024
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
he value of new information depends on how accurate the information is, but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in. We develop a game-theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits. Our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher, suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries. Our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information, information is more valuable for larger firms. We find that, except under some conditions, more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a Stackelberg mode of conduct than in a Bertrand-Nash mode.
引用
收藏
页码:1075 / 1084
页数:10
相关论文
共 38 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], HDB OPERATIONS RES M
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1998, MARKETING RES
[3]  
[Anonymous], MARKETING RES ANAL
[4]  
[Anonymous], MARKETING SCI
[5]   INFORMATIONAL PROPERTIES OF NASH SOLUTIONS OF 2 STOCHASTIC NONZERO-SUM GAMES [J].
BASAR, T ;
HO, YC .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 7 (04) :370-387
[7]  
Basu A.K., 1985, MARKET SCI, V4, P267, DOI DOI 10.1287/MKSC.4.4.267
[8]  
Basu A. K., 1990, Int. J. Res. Mark, V7, P171, DOI [10.1016/0167-8116(90)90019-J, DOI 10.1016/0167-8116(90)90019-J]
[9]   Logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior: An equilibrium framework [J].
Besanko, D ;
Gupta, S ;
Jain, D .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1998, 44 (11) :1533-1547
[10]   DATABASE MODELS AND MANAGERIAL INTUITION - 50-PERCENT MODEL + 50-PERCENT MANAGER [J].
BLATTBERG, RC ;
HOCH, SJ .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1990, 36 (08) :887-899