Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous

被引:54
作者
Carlier, G
Dana, RA
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, CEREMADE, F-75775 Paris 16, France
[2] Univ Bordeaux, GRAPE, F-33608 Pessac, France
关键词
efficient insurance contracts; discontinuous cost function; auditing;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-002-0281-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider the problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim. We prove existence of efficient insurance contracts and that the indemnity function in such contracts is non-decreasing in the damage. We further show that either there is no insurance, or the indemnity is positive for all losses, or efficient insurance contracts have a unique jump. We study variants of the model and provide a generalization to the case of non expected utilities. Our results are then applied to Townsend's model of deterministic auditing.
引用
收藏
页码:871 / 893
页数:23
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