On preference and freedom

被引：81

作者：

Pattanaik, PK ^{[1
]}

Xu, YS

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Econ, Riverside, CA 92521 USA

[2] Univ Nottingham, Dept Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 1998年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

freedom; opportunity set; ranking; reasonable person's preferences;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1004924211553

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.

引用

页码：173 / 198

页数：26

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