Coalition formation as a dynamic process

被引:131
作者
Konishi, H
Ray, D
机构
[1] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[3] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Bellaterra 08193, Barcelona, Spain
关键词
coalition formation; farsightedness; dynamic equilibrium;
D O I
10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00004-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be "justified" by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. In addition, we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium PCFs. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 41
页数:41
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