Is the median voter a clear-cut winner?: Comparing the median voter theory and competing theories in explaining local government spending

This paper attempts to test the power of the median model against the respective strength of other alternate models based on redistributive, political-institutional and interest group theories in explaining the demand for public spending in New York state counties during 1990, 1980 and 1970. To execute the comparison of the performance of median voter model with that of each of the nonmedian voter ones, various nonnested tests such as J and JA tests, N-tilde, W and encompassing tests have been employed. Results of the study show that although the median voter model has a marginal edge over the rival models based on the alternative theories, it may not be relied upon solely when many other institutional, redistributive and interest group factors are also relevant for explaining public spending. The results of this study differ from those in Congleton and Bennett (1995). We do not find that interest group models are substantially weaker than the median voter model.