Malicious code detection for open firmware

被引：8

作者：

Adelstein, F ^{[1
]}

Stillerman, M ^{[1
]}

Kozen, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ATC NY, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA

来源：

18TH ANNUAL COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS | 2002年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/CSAC.2002.1176312

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically written by third-party device manufacturers and may come from various suppliers of unknown origin. In this paper we describe an approach to this problem based on load-time verification of onboard device drivers against a standard security policy designed to limit access to system resources. We also describe our ongoing effort to construct a prototype of this technique for Open Firmware boot platforms.

引用

页码：403 / 412

页数：10

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