Political institutions and policy choices: Evidence from the United States

被引：416

作者：

Besley, T ^{[1
]}

Case, A

机构：

[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE | 2003年 / 41卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/002205103321544693

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：7 / 73

页数：67

共 166 条

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