Political institutions and electric utility investment: A cross-nation analysis

被引：69

作者：

Bergara, ME ^{[1
]}

Henisz, WJ ^{[1
]}

Spiller, PT ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW | 1998年 / 40卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/41165931

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The likelihood that a government will meet its promises varies with the structure of a nation's political institutions. Where multiple independent actors wield veto power over potential policy changes, macroeconomic, tax, and regulatory stability will be enhanced-thus reducing the variance on an investment project's expected return. This relationship is shown to hold for an industry with extremely high sunk costs and politicization, namely, electric utilities. Managers considering investment in infrastructure projects should therefore evaluate the investment proposal not only on its explicit terms, but also on the likelihood that the government will honor them.

引用

页码：18 / +

页数：19