The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation

被引：262

作者：

David, P ^{[1
]}

Kochhar, R

Levitas, E

机构：

[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore 2263, Singapore

[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

[3] Texas A&M Univ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1998年 / 41卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.5465/257102

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences to (1) lower its level and (2) increase the proportion of long-term incentives in total compensation; However, institutions that depend on a firm for their own business are not able to influence compensation in this manner. This study extends prior research by supporting the viewpoint that the nature of ownership in a firm is an important determinant of CEO compensation.

引用

页码：200 / 208

页数：9

共 45 条

[1] MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES, MONITORING, AND RISK BEARING - A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, OWNERSHIP, AND BOARD STRUCTURE IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS [J].