Capacities, universality, and singularity

被引：20

作者：

Glennan, SS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Butler Univ, Dept Philosophy & Religious Studies, Indianapolis, IN 46208 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 1997年 / 64卷 / 04期

关键词：

LAWS;

D O I：

10.1086/392574

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.

引用

页码：605 / 626

页数：22

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