Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice

被引:300
作者
Cohen, Alma
Einav, Liran
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Dept Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, John M Olin Res Ctr Law Econ & Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[5] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.97.3.745
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts. We account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (claim rate) and risk aversion. We find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes. In addition, women are more risk averse than men, risk aversion exhibits a U-shape with respect to age, and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk, and, as we illustrate, has important implications for insurance pricing.
引用
收藏
页码:745 / 788
页数:44
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