Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes

被引：208

作者：

Sliwka, Dirk ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cologne, D-50931 Cologne, Germany

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2007年 / 97卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.97.3.999

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：999 / 1012

页数：14

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