The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

被引：77

作者：

Alós-Ferrer, C

Ania, AB

机构：

[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

[2] Univ Salamanca, E-37008 Salamanca, Spain

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2005年 / 26卷 / 03期

关键词：

aggregative games; evolutionarily stable strategy; price-taking behavior; stochastic stability; supermodularity;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

引用

页码：497 / 516

页数：20

共 29 条

[1] Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions [J].