The exclusion principle for symmetric multi-prize all-pay auctions with endogenous valuations

被引：2

作者：

Arbatskaya, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Emory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2003年 / 80卷 / 01期

关键词：

exclusion principle; multi-prize all-pay auction; entry; contest;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00041-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explains why contest designers may limit entry into a symmetric multi-prize all-pay auction. The revenue-maximizing size of the group of 'finalists' depends on the extent to which prize values decrease or increase with the number of contestants. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：73 / 80

页数：8