Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

被引：52

作者：

Carpenter, J ^{[1
]}

Matthews, P

Ong'ong'a, O

机构：

[1] Middlebury Coll, Dept Econ, Middlebury, VT 05753 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 14卷 / 04期

关键词：

social dilemma; punishment; norm; evolutionary game theory; experiment;

D O I：

10.1007/s00191-004-0212-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.

引用

页码：407 / 429

页数：23

共 27 条

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