Occupational licensing in a "competitive" labor market: The case of cosmetology

被引：18

作者：

Adams, AF ^{[1
]}

Jackson, JD

Ekelund, RB

机构：

[1] Kennesaw State Univ, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USA

[2] Auburn Univ, Auburn, AL 36849 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH | 2002年 / 23卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s12122-002-1006-6

中图分类号：

F24 [劳动经济];

学科分类号：

020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

A straightforward model of supply and demand is developed to analyze the regulation of a "competitive" industry - cosmetology - with demand shifts representing an enhancement of "quality" and supply shifts representing restricted entry. Reduced-form models are established to estimate both price and quantity shifts, adjusted for the joint determination of cosmetological prices, quantities, and state regulations. Our results reveal a significant net decrease in quantity from the imposition of state occupational regulation in the cosmetology market. Rents to cosmetologists would be on,the order of $1.7 billion per year with deadweight losses totaling an additional $111 million per annum under reasonable and conservative assumptions.

引用

页码：261 / 278

页数：18

共 29 条

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[2]

[Anonymous], OCCUPATIONAL LICENSU

[3]

Blair R., 1980, REGULATING PROFESSIO, P185

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