The South China Sea dispute revisited

This article suggests that an analysis of the opportunities and threats presented by the regional context shows that the South China Sea disputes of 1974 and 1988, as well as those in 1995 and 1999, will reveal a pattern of Chinese behaviour, which may be described as 'capitalising on opportunities' as China seeks to exert its jurisdiction over its South China Sea claims. It would appear that Beijing is extremely adept at capitalising on the right moment-when its perceived opponents are either distracted or when no strong response is expected-to make its move, and in all four cases, Beijing has been successful. When discussing China and the South China Sea, it is important at the outset to bear two points in mind. First, China claims ownership of all the islands in the South China Sea and in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, it is their sovereign right to do what they want on those islands, cays and reefs. Second, the decision-making processes in China remain opaque. Despite the end of the Cold War, which has resulted in the opening of once-secret Russian and Eastern European archives, there was no compulsion for China to make their archives equally accessible to researchers. Thus, researchers have still not been able fully, if at all, to document and account for many of Beijing's policies and actions. In the case of the 1974 and 1988 naval encounters, we are no wiser today than we were 20 years ago. However, the following facts when put together would reveal a certain pattern in Chinese actions in the South China Sea.